Taxation--Succession Tax--Life Interest Retained by Settlor Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Blodgett, 53 S. Ct. 244 (1932)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 7 
Number 2 Volume 7, May 1933, Number 2 Article 33 
June 2014 
Taxation--Succession Tax--Life Interest Retained by Settlor 
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Blodgett, 53 S. Ct. 244 (1932)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1933) "Taxation--Succession Tax--Life Interest Retained by Settlor Guaranty Trust 
Co. of New York v. Blodgett, 53 S. Ct. 244 (1932))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 7 : No. 2 , Article 33. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol7/iss2/33 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
TAXATION-SUCCESSION TAX-LIFE INTEREST RETAINED BY
SETTLOR.-The settlor, domiciled in Connecticut, died January 26,
1930, having executed in New York on December 28, 1926, an ir-
revocable deed of trust to a New York Trust Company of certain
securities, providing income to settlor for life, upon her death in-
come to settlor's husband during his life, upon his death trustee to
pay and transfer principal to daughter, if living, if not, to her issue.
The State Court ' sought to tax under the Public Acts of Connecti-
cut.2 The trustees appealed, contending that it infringed the con-
tract impairment clause and the 14th Amendment of Federal Con-
stitution. Held, No violation of Federal Constitution. Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York v. Blodgett, 286 U. S. - , 53 Sup. Ct.
244 (1932).
The Court, disregarding Nickel v. Cole 3 which declared a re-
troactive estate tax unconstitutional on the same facts, for the first
time expressly validated a succession tax where decedent retained
only a life interest in the property taxed.4 A succession tax, how-
ever, has been upheld where the settlor retained a power of ap-
pointment in conjunction with a trustee.5 The Court construed the
Act of 1923, without regard to the Act of 1929,6 as embracing the
event sought to be taxed, and since in that view the question of
contract impairment does not arise, it was bound by the decision of
the state court 7 as though the meaning as fixed by the court had
been expressed in the statute itself in specific words,8 and held that
the imposition of the tax did not offend the 14th Amendment nor
any provision of the Federal Constitution.9
If the trust had been revocable as in the Reinecke case,'0 we
would be entirely in accord with the decision, since the Public Acts
of 1923 11 was revived practically in its entirety so far as applicable
to the question here involved. However, the irrevocability created
in the donees a vested right in 1926, and the intention of the settlor
in creating the instrument must be considered by the court. Four
years elapsed between the time the instrument was executed and
settlor's death. Inferentially it was not a gift in extrenzis.12 Con-
'114 Conn. 207, 158 Atl. 245 (1932).
'PUB. ACTS CONN., 1929, c. 299, §§1, 2; PUB. ACTS CONN., 1923, c. 190, §1.
'Nickel v. Cole, 256 U. S. 222, 41 Sup. Ct. 467 (1921) ; see also Milliken
v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 20, 23, 51, Sup. Ot. 324, 327 (1931).
'Moffit v. Kelley, 218 U. S. 400, 31 Sup. Ct. 79 (1910); Keeney v. New
York, 222 U. S. 525, 32 Sup. Ct. 105 (1912); Nickel v. Cole, supra note 2.
'Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225 (1928).
Supra note 2.
'Supra note 2.
' Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444, 44 Sup. Ct. 197 (1924);
Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U. S. 30, 44 Sup. Ct. 246 (1924); Great Northern
Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. -, 53 Sup. Ct. 145 (1932).
'See Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582, 586, 51 Sup. Ct. 306, 309 (1931).
"See Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct.
353 (1929).
'Supra note 2.
'See Note (1932) 7 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 138, 140.
TAX COMMENT
fusion may result when this decision is placed beside Coolidge v.
Long.13
H. B. B.
INHERITANCE TAX-INTANGIBLES-DETERMINATION OF SITUS
-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-Decedent, at the time of his death, was
a British subject, domiciled in Cuba. At the time of his death he
was not engaged in business in the United States, but owned bonds
of foreign corporations, bonds of foreign governments, and stock
in a foreign corporation, which were in the possession of either
his son or a brokerage firm for care. All of the stocks and bonds
were physically in New York City. These securities were not used
in any business, nor held as a pledge for the security of a debt.
The son collected the income on such securities as he held, and de-
posited it in a New York bank on his father's account. The bro-
kerage firm deposited its collections in an account of the decedent
with that firm, against which the decedent drew checks. The Board
of Tax Appeals and the Circuit Court of Appeals held such prop-
erty not taxable, recognizing them as not situated in the United
States, held reversed. Burnet v. Brooks et al., 286 U. S. -, S3
Sup. Ct. 457 (1933).
In the determinaiion of whether the property in question is
covered by the Revenue Act of 1924,1 the court found it necessary
to ascertain the intention of the legislature.2 This problem as to
who retains the right to collect an inheritance tax, has been a well
litigated one.3 In a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court has
'Supra note 9.
1 Rv. AcT oF 1924, c. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 303-307.
'The statute made no distinction between tangible and intangible property.
As to tangibles and intangibles, alike, it made the test simply one of situs.
Eidman v. Mantez, 184 U. S. 578, 22 Sup. Ct. 515 (1902). Congress retains
the right to impose an inheritance tax on property in this country no matter
where owned or transmitted. The regulations promulgated by the treasury
department, interpreting the words "situated in the United States,"& bear out
this view. Reg. #37, Art. 60, T. D. 2378, 2910, 3145: "The 'situs of the
property,' both real and personal, for the purpose of tax, is its actual situs.
Stock in a domestic corporation, and insurance payable by a domestic insurance
company, constitute property situated in the United States, although owned by
and payable to a non-resident. Bonds actually situated in the United States,
monies on deposit with domestic banks and monies due on open accounts by
domestic debtors constitute property subject to tax." See Sen. Rep. #275,
67 Cong. 1st Sess., p. 25.
'Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59
(1929) ; Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct.
98 (1930); (1930) 4 ST. JOHN's L. RFv. 322; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S.
586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930) ; (1930) 5 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 136; Beidler v. So.
Carolina Tax Comm., 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54 (1930) ; Note (1930) 5 ST.
JOHN's L. Rv. 288; Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Comm., 283 U. S.
297, 51 Sup. Ct. 436 (1931) ; Note (1931) 6 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 173, 175; First
National Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, 52 Sup. Ct. 174 (1932); Note
(1932) 6 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 408.
